We introduce and study a new notion of enhanced chosen-ciphertext security (ECCA) for publickey encryption. Loosely speaking, in ECCA, when the decryption oracle returns a plaintext to the adversary, it also provides coins under which the returned plaintext encrypts to the queried ciphertext (when they exist). Our results mainly concern the case where such coins can also be recovered efficiently. We provide constructions of ECCA encryption from adaptive trapdoor functions as defined by Kiltz et al. (EUROCRYPT 2010), resulting in ECCA encryption from standard number-theoretic assumptions. We then give two applications of ECCA encryption: (1) We use it as a unifying concept in showing equivalence of adaptive trapdoor functions and tag-based adaptive trapdoor functions (namely, we show that both primitives are equivalent to ECCA encryption), resolving a main open question of Kiltz et al. (2) We show that ECCA encryption can be used to securely realize an approach to public-key encryption with non-interactive opening (PKENO) suggested by Damgård and Thorbek (EUROCRYPT 2007), resulting in new and practical PKENO schemes quite different from those in prior work. We believe our results indicate that ECCA is an intriguing notion that may prove useful in further work.
Introduction
This paper studies a new notion of security for public-key encryption we call enhanced chosen-ciphertext security (ECCA). Recall that in the standard formulation of CCA security [34] , the adversary, given a public-key pk, must guess which of the two possible messages its challenge ciphertext c encrypts, while being allowed to query a decryption oracle on any ciphertext c ′ different from c. Very informally, our "enhancement" is that the decryption oracle, when queried on a ciphertext c ′ , returns not only a decrypted plaintext m ′ but also coins r ′ such that m ′ encrypts to c ′ under pk using coins r ′ (in the case that the ciphertext is in the range of the encryption algorithm). ECCA is largely motivated by the related concept of randomness-recovering encryption (as highlighted in e.g. [33] ), meaning the decryption procedure also recovers such r ′ efficiently. Interestingly, however, not every randomness-recovering encryption scheme is ECCA secure, because randomness-recovery refers to the behavior of an honest sender whereas an ECCA adversary can make malicious decryption queries. (In fact, in Section 3 we show how to design a randomness-recovering CCA PKE scheme that is provably insecure against an ECCA adversary. 1 ) Besides being interesting in its own right, we find that ECCA plays a fundamental role in contexts where randomness-recovering encryption is important, in particular the contexts of adaptive trapdoor functions [28] and public-key encryption with non-interactive opening [13] . (We also believe ECCA will find future applications given the importance of randomness-recovering encryption.)
Below we describe our results concerning ECCA in more detail; for a pictorial summary, see Figure 1 .
ECCA-Secure Constructions and Relation to Adaptive Trapdoor Functions
Background. A foundational line of work in cryptography examines the relations between public-key encryption (PKE) and trapdoor functions (TDFs). A specific question studied in recent works [33, 35, 28] is: What is the minimal security assumption on a trapdoor function needed to obtain a construction of CCA-secure PKE? Currently, the minimal assumption (in terms of black-box implications) is that of adaptivity [28] . Intuitively, adaptivity is a form of CCA security for TDFs, asking that the TDF remain one-way even when the adversary may query an inversion oracle on points other than its challenge. 2 Results. We find that the notion of ECCA security for encryption is very natural to consider in this context. Indeed, while [28] showed that ATDFs imply CCA secure encryption, we show that ATDFs are equivalent to randomness-recovering ECCA-secure encryption. This helps us better understand the power of ATDFs and gives us constructions of ECCA secure encryption from a variety of standard number-theoretic assumptions as per [28] . We furthermore show that "tag-based" ATDFs as defined in [28] are also equivalent to randomness-recovering ECCA-secure encryption, a corollary being ATDFs and tag-based ATDFs are themselves equivalent, which resolves a foundational question left open by [28] . We next discuss how we obtain these results in more detail.
Technical approach. It is easy to see that from randomness-recovering ECCA-secure encryption we can get an ATDF, simply by viewing the input to the trapdoor function as consisting of the message and the coins for the encryption scheme. The other direction is more challenging. To see why, recall that [28] constructs CCA-secure encryption from a ATDFs in the following manner: first, they construct, a onebit CCA-secure encryption scheme and then apply a transform of Myers and shelat [31] from one-bit to many-bit CCA-secure encryption. But the one-bit scheme of [28] -which works by re-sampling a domain point x until the hardcore bit of x equals the message -is not randomness-recovering, since decryption does not recover the "thrown away" x's. 3 Furthermore, even if it was, the construction of many-bit CCA-secure encryption in [31] does not seem to preserve either randomness-recovery or ECCA-security of the one-bit scheme. (In particular, the construction of [31] uses an "inner," "q-bounded" non-malleable encryption scheme, and we do not know how to construct such a scheme that has analogous "enhanced" security.) We solve both these problems at once via a novel application of detectable CCA (DCCA) security, introduced very recently by Hohenberger et al. [26] . Informally, DCCA is defined relative to a "detecting" function F that determines whether two ciphertexts are related; in the DCCA experiment, the adversary is not allowed to ask for decryptions of ciphertexts related to the challenge ciphertext according to F. The work of [26] shows how to construct a CCA-secure encryption from a DCCA-secure one. In particular, bit-by-bit encryption using a 1-bit CCA secure encryption scheme is easily seen to be DCCA secure, is the main application considered in [26] . (It thus encompasses the earlier work of [31] and builds on the techniques of the latter.) Our novelty is that we construct a DCCA secure scheme from ATDFs that also uses bit-by-bit encryption, but where the underlying one-bit encryption scheme is not CCA securenamely, we use a "naïve" one-bit scheme from ATDFs that simply XOR's the message bit with a hardcore bit of the ATDF. The benefit is that this one-bit scheme is randomness recovering. We show that in fact the resulting bit-by-bit scheme now satisfies a notion of DCCA with analogous "enhanced" security. Then, we show that (in contrast to [31] ) the construction of CCA from DCCA in [26] preserves both this enhanced security as well as randomness recovery -that is, if we start with a randomness-recovering, enhanced DCCA secure scheme, we end up with a randomness-recovering ECCA secure one. We thus get a randomness-recovering ECCA secure scheme from ATDFs as desired. We note that a by-product of our results is to show that, complementing [31] , one-bit encryption is also complete for randomness-recovering CCA and ECCA.
We note that it is much easier to construct a randomness-recovering ECCA-secure scheme from a tagbased ATDFs; in fact, we show that the construction of CCA-secure encryption from tag-based ATDFs given in [28] , which uses the BCHK transform [7] , already works. Indeed, the apparent extra power of tag-based ATDFs makes it surprising that they are equivalent to (non tag-based) ATDFs.
We also point out that part of what makes the above construction challenging is that the ATDF only has a single hardcore bit. Given a linear number of hardcore bits (see [28] for some instantiations), one can use the KEM/DEM paradigm to obtain more efficient constructions of ECCA PKE from ATDFs. Surprisingly, the standard assumption that the DEM component is CCA-secure (or ECCA) is no longer sufficient, but we show that it is enough to assume that the DEM is a one-time authenticated encryption (See Appendix B).
Applications to Public-Key Encryption with Non-Interactive Opening
Background. Public-key encryption with non-interactive opening (PKENO), introduced by Damgård an Thorbeck [14] and studied in detail by [13, 17, 18] , allows a receiver to non-interactively prove to anyone that a ciphertext c decrypts to a message m. As discussed by the above-mentioned works, PKENO has applications to multiparty computation (e.g., auctions and elections), secure message transmission, group signatures, and more. But despite numerous applications, such schemes have been difficult to realize. Secure constructions of PKENO currently exist from identity-based encryption [13] and robust non-interactive threshold encryption [18] .
An alternative approach. We show that ECCA encryption can be used to securely realize an simple and natural approach to PKENO originally suggested by [14] but not made to work in the literature. The basic idea is to use a randomness-recovering encryption scheme and have the receiver provide the recovered coins as the proof. However, several issues need to be addressed for this approach to work. One problem already discussed in [18, Section 4.1] is that there must also be a way for the receiver to prove the claimed behavior of the decryption algorithm on ciphertexts that might not even be an output of the based variant. encryption algorithm, and for which no underlying coins necessarily exist. (Note that such ciphertexts may or may not decrypt to ⊥ in general.) Moreover, we point out that the encryption scheme must be ECCA secure (which was not even defined in prior work); standard chosen-ciphertext security is not enough here, because here the adversary in the corresponding PKENO security game has the ability to see random coins underlying ciphertexts of its choosing. We now describe our results in more detail.
PKENO-compatible ECCA encryption. First, we formalize a notion of PKENO-compatible ECCAsecure encryption, for which we can overcome the above problems. There are two requirements for such a scheme. The first is that it is what we call partial-randomness recovering. This means that there is a partial-randomness recovery algorithm that, informally, given the secret key does not necessarily recover all random coins underlying a ciphertext, but just enough to check that the ciphertext is an encryption of a claimed message. However, this should also be true for ciphertexts outside the range of the encryption algorithm (but which do not decrypt to ⊥). 4 The second requirement is that it has what we call ciphertext verifiability, meaning one can check without the secret key (but possibly with the help of some partial random coins) whether the decryption of a ciphertext is ⊥. Note that ECCA security of such schemes is defined with respect to the partial-randomness recovery algorithm. See Section 6.1 for the formal definitions, which are rather delicate.
Given such a PKENO-compatible ECCA scheme, we can safely use the message and the partial randomness as the non-interactive opening of the ciphertext.
PKENO-compatible ECCA encryption from NIZK. We next show a generic construction of PKENO-compatible ECCA secure encryption from any (partial) randomness recovering ECCA encryption scheme, namely by adding a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof to a ciphertext that there exist some underlying message and random coins. (Indeed, the idea of adding such a proof of wellformedness to achieve PKENO] comes from [14, 18] , although not in connection with ECCA.) We show that in order for the proof to go through, however, the NIZK needs to be simulation-sound.
We also show that the same idea works to construct an analogous notion of PKENO-compatible ECCA tag-based encryption scheme from a (partial) randomness recovering ECCA-secure tag-based encryption scheme. One can then efficiently transform a PKENO-compatible tag-based scheme into a standard PKENO using either of the two transforms from [7] . (Interestingly, for the more-efficient transform based on symmetric-key primitives to work, we crucially exploit that ciphertext verifiability as defined above can use partial random coins; the scheme is not "publicly verifiable." ) As explained next, our most efficient instantiations follow the tag-based approach.
Efficient schemes from tag-based ATDFs. While it is possible to construct NIZKs efficiently in the random-oracle model (which we prefer to avoid), the only known efficient instantiation of NIZKs without random oracles to date are Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs [22] , which allow to prove a certain class of statements over bilinear groups. (Moreover, as shown in [30] , GS proofs can be made simulation-sound at a moderate price.) In order to take advantage of this instantiation we need a scheme for which the statement we need to prove falls in this class. We show that this is the case for a certain tag-based encryption scheme from the decision-linear assumption (DLIN). This scheme is built from a tag-based ATDF, which is itself built by instantiating a construction of [28] using the DLIN-based lossy and all-butone TDFs of Freeman et al. [16] . A novelty of our scheme is that the statement we need to prove is that a range point of the tag-based ATDF has a pre-image which is a fundamentally weaker statement than one guaranteeing well-formedness of the ciphertext (as used in our generic construction), but (perhaps surprisingly) still suffices in the PKENO construction. See Section 6.2 for details.
Although our DLIN-based instantiation avoids using generic NIZKs or random oracles, it is probably still not efficient enough for practical use. To obtain such a scheme we consider tag-based ATDFs with an additional property we call range verifiability. Intuitively, range verifiability allows us to check the same Relations between various primitives studied in this paper. Dashed implications are trivial. Implications with question mark are unknown. "RR-CCA PKE" is randomness-recovering chosen-ciphertext secure PKE. "ATDF" is adaptive trapdoor function. "TB-ATDF" is tag-based adaptive trapdoor function. "PKENO" is public-key encryption with non-interactive opening.
property that the Groth-Sahai statement in our above construction is intended to prove, hence eliminating the need for any NIZK proof at all. We show that the tag-based ATDF constructed in [28] from the instance-independent RSA assumption (II-RSA) has this property. Although the assumption is quite strong, the resulting PKENO scheme is extremely practical: it requires only one 512-bit exponentiation to encrypt, whereas the previous DLIN-based scheme of [18] requires several (though it is based on a more standard assumption). We note that the resulting scheme (assuming we use the more-efficient version of the BCHK [7] transform) is also fully randomness recovering, showing that it is in fact possible to achieve fully (rather than partial) randomness recovering PKENO-compatible ECCA encryption.
Related Work
ECCA is similar in spirit to coin-revealing selective opening attack (SOA-C) [8, 15, 2, 6] . In the latter setting, there are say n ciphertexts encrypting related (but unknown) messages under independent random coins, and the adversary requests the plaintexts and random coins corresponding to some subset of them; the question is whether the "unopened" ciphertexts remain secure. However, it seems to us that SOA-C is neither implied by, nor implies, ECCA. On the one hand, in ECCA the adversary does not "open" ciphertexts whose messages are sampled jointly with the challenge message, but, on the other hand, in SOA-C the adversary does not "open" maliciously-formed ciphertexts (this is true even when considering SOA-C in context of CCA security as in [23, 24] ). It is an interesting question whether ECCA has any applications in the domain of SOA-C. An analogue of ECCA has been previously defined for commitment schemes by Canetti et al. [10] , which they call CCA-secure commitments, in the context of secure multiparty computation. These are commitment schemes that remain secure when the adversary has access to an unbounded decommitment oracle that it can call on commitments other than the challenge. They are interested in such schemes that are interactive but in the plain model, meaning there are no public keys. Thus, our setting seems incomparable (as we disallow interaction but allow public keys). However, we view their work as supporting the claim that ECCA is a natural notion of security to consider for encryption.
Other variants of CCA-security for encryption considered before include replayable CCA security [9] , constrained CCA security [25] , and detectable CCA security [26] . Notably, these are all relaxations of CCA security, whereas we consider a strengthening. Another strengthening of CCA security previously considered is plaintext awareness [5, 1, 4] .
Preliminaries
Notation and conventions. If A is an algorithm then y ← A(x 1 , . . . , x n ; r) means we run A on inputs x 1 , . . . , x n and coins r and denote the output by y. By y ←$ A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) we denote the operation of picking r at random and letting y ← A(x 1 , . . . , x n ; r). Unless otherwise indicated, an algorithm may be randomized. "PPT" stands for "probabilistic polynomial time" and "PT" stands for "polynomial time." The security parameter is denoted k ∈ N. If we say that an algorithm is efficient we mean that it is PPT (in the security parameter). All algorithms we consider are efficient unless indicated otherwise.
Standard primitives. We recall the definitions of standard primitives such as trapdoor functions and public-key encryption in Appendix A.
Enhanced Chosen-Ciphertext Security
Randomness recovery. We start with a definition of randomness recovery for public-key encryption. For any public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec) we specify an additional randomness recovery algorithm that takes a secret key sk and ciphertext c to return coins r; that is, we write PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec, Rec). To our knowledge, this notion has been discussed informally in the literature (e.g. in [33] ) but our formalization is novel. Suppose Enc draws its coins from Coins. We require that for all messages m ∈ MsgSp(1 k )
is negligible. Note that we do not require r = r ′ ; that is, the randomness recovery algorithm need not return the same coins used for encryption; indeed, it may not be possible, information theoretically, to determine r from sk and c. We also do not require Rec to be efficient. This means that having such Rec is not an additional assumption; we can always assume Rec is the canonical, inefficient randomness recovery algorithm that exhaustively searches Coins(1 k ) until it finds such r ′ . But in the special case that Rec is PT we say that PKE is randomness recovering. If in addition the forgoing condition on Rec holds for r = r ′ we say that PKE is uniquely randomness recovering. In the general definition that follows randomness recovering PKE is an important special case, but it is not assumed by the definition. In the case of tag-based public-key encryption, Rec also takes a tag as input. In this case we require that for all m ∈ MsgSp(1 k ) and t ∈ TagSp(1 k )
is negligible.
ECCA definition. We are now ready to state our new notion of enhanced chosen-ciphertext security. Let PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme. We associate to PKE and an adversary
Above we require that the output of A 1 satisfies |m 0 | = |m 1 | and that A 2 does not query c to its oracle. Define the ind-ecca advantage of A against PKE as
We say that PKE is enhanced chosen-ciphertext secure (ECCA-secure) if Adv ind-ecca PKE,A (·) is negligible for every efficient A.
Note that when PKE is randomness recovering, the ECCA experiment is efficient. Additionally, the case of randomness-recovering ECCA public-key encryption will be important in the applications we consider.
In general, however, one can still ask whether a scheme meets the notion of ECCA even when it is not randomness recovering. Indeed, Canetti et al. [10] did so in the context of commitments. In this case, it may still be possible to simulate the ECCA experiment efficiently since in the proof of security we are additionally given the code of the adversary A (and so, for example, the randomness for encryption might be efficiently extractable from the code of A using non-black-box techniques). However, we do not currently have any constructions of ECCA without randomness recoverability or applications of such a scheme.
Is ECCA Stronger than CCA? A natural question to ask is whether ECCA security is a strictly stronger requirement than CCA security or not. In fact, one can ask the same question when the CCA scheme is also randomness-recovering. We answer this question by describing a randomness recovering CCA encryption scheme that provably does not satisfy ECCA security. We note that our example works in the random oracle model. It would be interesting to provide a similar construction in the standard model. It is also an interesting open question to extend these ideas into a full-fledged separation between the two notions of CCA and ECCA security.
Consider a randomness-recovering CCA-secure scheme PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec), and let H : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} |sk| be a hash function modeled as a random oracle. We transform PKE to a new scheme PKE new = (Kg new , Enc new , Dec new ) thats is not ECCA secure. The idea is to encrypt the sk using the randomness of a ciphertext c and to embed c and the encryption of sk in the public key of the PKE + new. Querying c to the decryption oracle in the ECCA game would allow the attacker to recover sk and break the scheme. the PKE new is constructed as follows:
Claim 3.1 PKE new is a randomness-recovering CCA encryption schemes but is not ECCA secure.
Sketch.
It is easy to see that PKE new is not ECCA secure. In particular, consider the following simple attack: the public key consists of (pk, Enc(pk, 0; r), H(r) ⊕ sk. Adversary makes a decryption query for Enc(pk, 0; r) in the ECCA security game and receives (0, r) back. He then computes H(r), and XORs with the third component of the public key to obtain sk.
We now need to show that PKE new remains CCA secure. But this argument easily follows from the CCA security of the PKE and the fact that given a ciphertext Enc(pk, 0; r), H(r) is uniformly random if H is a random oracle. The latter is the case since the randomness used in encryption needs to remain unpredictable given the ciphertext for the scheme to be secure. We omit the standard hybrid argument that formalizes this intuition.
Tag-based definition. Let TB-PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec) be a tag-based public-key encryption scheme with tag-space TagSp. We associate to TB-PKE and an adversary A = (
Above we require that the output of A 2 satisfies |m 0 | = |m 1 | and that A 3 does not make a query of the form Dec * (sk, t, ·) to its oracle. Define the ind-tb-ecca advantage of A against PKE as
We say that TB-PKE is tag-based enhanced chosen-ciphertext secure (TB-ECCA-secure) if Adv
Instantiations
We now detail several constructions of ECCA secure encryption. They are based on notions of adaptivity for trapdoor functions introduced in [28] so accordingly we recall those first.
Adaptivity for Trapdoor Functions
Adaptive trapdoor functions. Let TDF = (Tdg, Eval, Inv) be a trapdoor function family. We associate to TDF and an inverter I an adaptive one-way experiment,
Above we require that I does not query y to its oracle. Define the aow-advantage of A against TDF as
We say that TDF is adaptive one-way (or is an ATDF) if Adv aow TDF,I (·) is negligible for every efficient I. Tag-based adaptivity. Let TB-TDF = (Tdg, Eval, Inv) be a tag-based trapdoor function family. We associate to TDF and an inverter I = (I 1 , I 2 ) a tag-based adaptive one-way experiment,
Above we require that I 2 does not make a query of the form Inv(td, t, ·) to its oracle. Define the tb-aowadvantage of A against TB-TDF as
We say that TDF is tag-based adaptive one-way (or is a TB-ATDF) if Adv tb-aow TDF,I (·) is negligible for every efficient I.
Realizations. In [28] it is shown that ATDFs and tag-based ATDFs can be realized from lossy TDFs [33] and correlated-product secure TDFs [35] , which can be realized from a variety of standard numbertheoretic and lattice-based assumptions. Furthermore, tag-based ATDFs were constructed from a strong but non-decisional (i.e., search) problem on RSA in [28] .
ECCA Security from Adaptive Trapdoor Functions
Here we construct ECCA-secure public-key encryption from adaptive TDFs. Our construction draws heavily on the recent work of Hohenberger et al. [26] and their notion of detectable CCA security (DCCA). This should be contrasted with the approach of [28] used to obtain CCA-secure encryption from ATDFs. Our approach allows us to obtain "enhanced" security and also unique randomness recoverabilty. (See the Introduction for further elaboration.) We note that our construction applies to general ATDFs; in the case of ATDFs with a linear number of hardcore bits we obtain a much more efficient construction, see Appendix B for details.
Enhanced DCCA Security
The notion of Detectable Chosen Ciphertext (DCCA) security was recently introduced by [26] . We define here the notion of enhanced DCCA (EDCCA) security, which parallels the notion of enhanced CCA security. In our definition, we require that the DCCA scheme be both enhanced and randomnessrecovering. This is due to the fact that our application of DCCA requires both properties. However, the more general notion of enhanced DCCA security (with no efficient randomness-recovering property) may also be of interest.
Detectable Encryption Schemes. A detectable encryption scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (Kg, Enc, Dec, F) such that: (1) (Kg, Enc, Dec) constitute a public-key encryption scheme, and (2) F(pk, c ′ , c) → {0, 1}: the detecting function F takes as input a public key pk and two ciphertexts c ′ , c and outputs a bit.
Additionally, the detecting function F must have the following property: Informally, given the description of F and a public key pk, it it should be hard to find a second ciphertext c ′ that is related to a "challenge" ciphertext c, i.e. such that F(pk, c ′ , c) = 1, before being given c. See [26] for the formal definition of the unpredictability experiment.
EDCCA definition. We are now ready to define enhanced, detectable chosen ciphertext security. Let PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec, Rec, F) be a randomness-recovering public-key encryption scheme. We associate to PKE and an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) an enhanced detectable chosen-ciphertext attack experiment,
Above we require that the output of A 1 satisfies |m 0 | = |m 1 | and that A 2 does not query c to its oracle. Define the ind-edcca advantage of A against PKE as
We say that PKE is enhanced detectable chosen-ciphertext secure (EDCCA-secure) if
• Encryptions are indistinguishable: Adv ind-edcca PKE,A (·) is negligible for every efficient A AND
• F is unpredictable: Every efficient adversary A has negligible probability of succeeding in the unpredictability experiment (see [26] ).
EDCCA Security from ATDFs
We construct an EDCCA scheme from ATDFs as follows: Let TDF = (Tdg, Eval, Inv) be a trapdoor function with hardcore bit hc, for example the Goldreich-Levin bit [20] . Define the following multi-bit public-key encryption scheme
. . , y ℓ , β ℓ ), we define:
Claim 4.1 Suppose TDF is adaptive one-way. Then EDCCA[TDF] defined above is a multi-bit EDCCAsecure encryption scheme.
We give some intuition for why the claim holds. Assume towards contradiction that we have an efficient adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) breaking EDCCA [TDF] . Using a standard hybrid argument, we have that there must be some index 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ such that A successfully distinguishes encryptions of messages m 0 , m 1 which differ only in the i-th bit. Now assuming the existence of A, we construct an efficient adversary A ′ breaking adaptive one-wayness of TDF.
More specifically, A ′ receivesỹ = Eval(ek,x) externally and uses A to learn hc(Inv(td, y i )). A ′ does this by simulating the EDCCA decryption oracle for A = (A 1 , A 2 ) using its inversion oracle Inv.
First, we consider simulating responses to queries made by A 1 . In this case, we have that with overwhelming probability, for every decryption query C = (y 1 , β 1 , . . . , y ℓ , β ℓ ) made by A 1 , it is the case that y j =ỹ for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ. Thus, A ′ can decrypt correctly using oracle access to Inv.
At the end of the first phase, A 1 chooses two messages m 0 = m 0 1 , . . . , m 0 ℓ and m 1 = m 1 0 , . . . , m 1 ℓ which differ only in the i-th bit. A ′ prepares the challenge ciphertext C * by choosing x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . x ℓ and a bit b uniformly at random and setting
If yes, A ′ perfectly simulates the decryption oracle by returning ⊥. If not, then this implies in particular that on input C = (y 1 , β 1 , . . . , y ℓ , β ℓ ), we have that y j =ỹ for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ. In this case, A ′ can use its access to the Inv oracle in order to respond correctly to the decryption query. We omit the technical details of the proof, since they are standard.
Remark 4.2 Scheme EDCCA[TDF] defined above is also uniquely randomness-recovering. This will be crucial for our application to adaptive trapdoor functions in Section 5.
We also wish to stress that it gives a novel example of a DCCA secure scheme; our scheme is not the concatenation of ciphertexts for a 1-bit CCA-secure scheme. Indeed, a ciphertext of the form (Eval(ek, x), hc(x) ⊕ m) is trivially malleable by flipping the second component.
From EDCCA to ECCA Security
We next show that the construction of [26] designed to build a CCA-secure scheme from a DCCA secure one allows us to go from EDCCA to ECCA. That is, beyond what was already shown in [26] we show that the construction preserves "enhanced" security; it also preserves (unique) randomnessrecoverabiility. Specifically, we instantiate the construction of [26] with the above randomness recovering EDCCA scheme, a CPA-secure scheme with perfect correctness, and a 1-bounded CCA-secure 5 scheme with perfect correctness (note that all these components can be constructed in a black-box manner from ATDFs):
The EDCCA scheme, EDCCA[TDF]: We instantiate the EDCCA scheme with the scheme given in Section 4.2.2. We note that for simplicity, we sometimes refer to the detecting function F D as checking for a "quoting" attack on the challenge ciphertext.
The CPA scheme, CPA[TDF]: We instantiate the CPA scheme with the same scheme EDCCA[TDF] as above. Note that this scheme has perfect correctness since the Inv algorithm of the ATDF is required to invert correctly with probability 1.
The 1-bounded CCA scheme, 1-CCA[TDF]: Since we have already observed above that we can construct a multi-bit CPA scheme with perfect correctness from ATDF, we may now use any construction of a multi-bit 1-bounded CCA scheme with perfect correctness from a multi-bit CPA scheme with perfect correctness. This can be done in a black-box manner via the [11] construction. It is not hard to see that the construction of [11] preserves the perfect correctness property.
The Multi-Bit (Uniquely Randomness Recovering) ECCA Scheme. We present a multi-bit, uniquely randomness recovering, ECCA-secure encryption scheme Note that Theorem 4.3 implies that there is a black-box construction of multi-bit, uniquely randomness recovering, enhanced CCA-secure encryption from ATDF.
Proof:
The proof is based on [26] . We begin by defining a game which is slightly different than the regular enhanced CCA game, but will be useful in our analsysis of PKE[TDF]:
Enhanced Nested Indistinguishability Game for scheme PKE[TDF]: We associate to the scheme PKE[TDF] and to an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) an enhanced nested indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack experiment, We will show that Bad Query Event occurs with at most negligible probability when z = 1 and when z = 0. Once we have shown this, Nested Indistinguishability of PKE[TDF] will follow in a straightforward manner.
Lemma 4.5 Bad Query Event occurs with negligible probability when z = 1.
We prove Lemma 4.5 via a sequence of hybrids:
Hybrid H 0 : Proceeds exactly as the nested indistinguishability game for the case where z = 1.
Hybrid H 1 : Proceeds exactly like H 0 except that CT * B is set to be:
Claim 4.6 The probability of a Bad Query Event in H 1 and H 0 differs by a negligible amount.
Since sk B is never used by the decryption oracle and since the decryption oracle can detect all Bad Query Events, the claim follows immediately by a reduction to the semantic security of CPA[TDF].
Hybrid H 2 : Proceeds exactly like H 1 except CT * A is set to be CT * A = Enc 1b (pk A , 1 k ; r A ).
Claim 4.7 The probability of Bad Query Event in H 2 is negligible.
The claim follows due to the fact that the challenge ciphertext in H 2 contains no information about CT * in and since the detecting function F D is unpredictable.
Claim 4.8 The probability of a Bad Query Event in H 2 and H 1 differs by a negligible amount.
Intuitively, Claim 4.8 will reduce to the 1-bounded CCA security of 1-CCA[TDF].
Proof: Assume towards contradiction that there is some efficient adversary A which causes Bad Query Event to occur with negligible probability in H 2 and non-negligible probability in H 1 . We denote by q the (polynomial) number of Phase 2 queries made by A. By standard hybrid argument, there must be some index i ∈ [q] such that the i-th Phase 2 query made by A in H 1 causes Bad Query Event to occur with non-negligible probability. On the other hand, for every index i, the i-th Phase 2 query made by A in H 2 causes Bad Query Event to occur with at most negligible probability.
Fix such i. We construct an adversary B which breaks the security of 1-CCA [TDF] . B will receive a challenge ciphertext that is either an encryption of CT * in or of 1 n . In case the challenge ciphertext was an encryption of CT * in , B will perfectly simulate the adversary's view in H 1 . In case the challenge ciphertext was an encryption of 1 n , B will perfectly simulate the adversary's view in H 2 .
Moreover, B will be able to detect whether Bad Query Event occurred in the i-th Phase 2 query of the experiment. Thus, if Bad Query Event occurs in the i-th query with non-negligible probability in H 1 and negligible probability in H 2 , then B will be able to break security of 1-CCA[TDF].
Formally, consider the following Simulated Decryption Oracle:
Simulated Decryption Oracle:
• Decrypt CT B using sk B to retreive CT in .
• Decrypt CT in using sk in to retrieve (r A , r B , m).
• Use the randomness recovering algorithm Rec D and sk in to retrieve r in = Rec D (sk in , CT in ).
• Check that CT A and CT B were formed correctly with respect to (r A , r B , CT in ). If not, output ⊥.
Otherwise, output (m, r A , r B , r in ).
Note that for every possible string CT submitted to the oracle, the output of the Simulated Decryption Oracle and the real decryption oracle is identical since 
• If so, B submits CT i A to its external 1-bounded CCA decryption oracle and receives CT i in in response.
• B checks whether F D (pk in , CT * in , CT i in ) = 1 (i.e. whether a quoting attack occurred). If yes, B outputs 0. Otherwise, B outputs 1.
Since by assumption we have that Bad Query Event occurs with non-negligible probability at the i-th Phase 2 query in H 1 and occurs with negligible probability at the i-th Phase 2 query in H 2 , we have that B achieves non-negligible advantage in the external 1-bounded CCA security game. This is a contradiction to the security of 1-CCA[TDF] and so the claim is proved. Lemma 4.5 follows immediately from Claims 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8.
We now turn to the case where z = 0: Lemma 4.9 Bad Query Event occurs with negligible probability when z = 0.
Intuitively, Lemma 4.9 will reduce to the enhanced detectable CCA security of EDCCA[TDF].
We have already shown that when z = 1, Bad Query Event occurs with negligible probability. We will now show that if there is an efficient adversary A causing Bad Query Event to occur with nonnegligible probability when z = 0, then there is a ppt adversary B breaking the security of EDCCA[TDF].
Assume towards contradiction that there is an efficient adversary A which causes Bad Query Event to occur with non-negligible probability when z = 0. Consider the following efficient adversary B which interacts with A in a run of the nested indistinguishability experiment, while externally participating in an enhanced DCCA indistinguishability experiment. B does the following:
Setup: B receives pk in externally from the EDCCA experiment. B honestly generates (sk A , pk A ), (sk B , pk B ). Otherwise, query the external EDCCA decryption oracle to decrypt CT in and return its randomness. Check that CT A and CT B are consistent with the response. If not, return ⊥. Otherwise, return the message and all randomness.
Output: When A outputs a bit, B outputs 0 or 1 with probability 1/2.
We argue that B correctly answers all decryption queries except when it aborts. This will follow immediately once we establish that B always answers correctly by returning ⊥ when a Case 2 query occurs. We next show that this is indeed the case.
Since a decryption query on the challenge is forbidden by the experiment, if CT A = CT * A , then CT B = CT * B . However, in this case CT must be an invalid ciphertext. We see this as follows: Since decryption is deterministic, we have that CT in = Dec 1b (sk A , CT A ) = Dec 1b (sk A , CT * A ) and (r A , r B , m) = Dec D (sk in , CT in ). But this means that there is only one possible ciphertext CT B that matches CT A = CT * A . Since the challenge CT * is a valid ciphertext, CT * B must be this value and so CT = (CT * A , CT B ) must be invalid. Now, if a Case 1 query occurs, B cannot decrypt using its EDCCA decryption oracle and must abort the experiment. But in this case, B can already guess that z = 0 since when z = 1, Case 1 occurs with negligible probability.
More specifically, when B aborts, it causes the external EDCCA experiment to output 1 with high probability. Moreover, when B does not abort, it causes the external EDCCA experiment to output 1 with probability 1/2. Since B aborts with non-negligible probability when z = 0, B causes the experiment's output to be 1 with probability non-negligibly greater than 1/2. This is a contradiction to the security of EDCCA [TDF] and so the claim is proved.
Finally, assuming that Bad Query Event occurs with negligible probability both when z = 0 and z = 1, we show that Nested Indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks holds. This is straightforward via a reduction to the enhanced DCCA security of EDCCA[TDF].
ECCA Security from Tag-Based Adaptive Trapdoor Functions
We next give constructions of ECCA-secure public-key encryption from tag-based adaptive trapdoor functions introduced by Kiltz et al. [28] .
From tag-based ATDF to tag-based ECCA-secure PKE. It is straightforward to construct a multi-bit tag-based ECCA-secure PKE scheme from a tag-based ATDF, as follows. Let TB-TDF = (Tdg, Eval, Inv) be a tag-based adaptive trapdoor function family with tag-space TagSp and hardcore bit hc. Define the following tag-based public-key encryption scheme TB-PKE[TB-TDF] = (Kg, Enc, Dec) with tag-space TagSp and message-space {0, 1} ℓ :
Alg Enc(ek, t, m) For i = 1 to ℓ do: ((c 1,1 , c 1,2 ) , . . . , (c ℓ,1 , c ℓ,2 )) Return c Alg Dec(td, t, c) ((c 1,1 , c 1,2 ) , . . . , (c ℓ,1 , c ℓ,2 )) ← c For i = 1 to ℓ do: We omit the proof, which is routine.
From ECCA-secure tag-based PKE to ECCA-secure PKE. Note that Kiltz et al. [28] show a construction of CCA-secure PKE from any CCA-secure tag-based PKE using a strongly one-time unforgeable signature scheme. However, this construction does not preserve the randomness-recovering property or the ECCA security of the tag-based PKE. To get around this issue, and to construct ECCA-secure PKE from ECCA-secure tag-based PKE we employ a transformation of Boneh et al. [7] , instead. Let TB-PKE = Kg tag , Enc tag , Dec tag ) be a tag-based public-key encryption scheme, H, g be hash functions, and MAC = (tag, ver) be a message-authentication code. Define PKE[TB-PKE, H, g, MAC] = (Kg, Enc, Dec):
, c 2 ) = 1 then return m Else return ⊥
Remark 4.12 If TB-PKE is (uniquely) randomness recovering, so is PKE[TB-PKE, H, g, MAC]
. In particular, this is the case when TB-PKE = TB-PKE[TB-TDF] as defined above. Thus, we obtain a uniquely randomness-recovering ECCA-secure PKE scheme from any tag-based ATDF.
Proposition 4.13 Suppose TB-PKE is ECCA-secure, H is target collision-resistant, g is pairwise-independent, and MAC is strongly unforgeable. Then PKE[TB-PKE, H, g, MAC] is ECCA-secure.
Proof: We prove security using a sequence of hybrids. Our proof follows that of [7] , and uses a deferred analysis technique originating from [19] .
Hybrid H 0 : The first game is the ind-cca game for PKE[TB-PKE, H, g, MAC] as defined earlier. Let c * = (c * 1 , c * 2 , c * 3 ) be the challenge ciphertext, and x * be random input used as input to the H when computing the challenge ciphertext.
Hybrid H 1 : H 1 is the same as H 0 except that on decryption queries of the form (c * 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) we always return ⊥. Let valid be the event that this ciphertext is indeed valid (it has a valid decryption).
Obviously we have that |Adv
. Let coll be the event that c 2 is valid and correctly decrypts to a message m||x and at the same time we have g(x) = g(x * ). Furthermore, let f orge be the event that c 3 ← tag(g(x * ), c 2 ). It is easy to see that
is negligible given the collision resistance of H. In particular, g(x) = g(x * ) implies that x = x * , which makes the pair (x, x * ) a collision for H. We note that this argument works in presence of an ECCA oracle as well. In particular, note that decryption queries of the form (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) are only answered if c 1 = c * 1 , and in this case, one can query c 2 to the decryption oracle for the tag-based PKE and recover both the underlying message and all the randomness used in generating the ciphertext (note that c 3 is deterministic given c 1 and c 2 ). Analyzing he bound on Pr 1 [f orge] is deferred to a later hybrid.
Hybrid H 2 : H 2 is the same as H 1 except that when computing the challenge ciphertext we compute c * 2 = Enc tag (pk, c 1 ,
A (k) = 1/2 for any PPT adversary A. It is also straightforward to see that |Adv Hybrid H 3 : H 3 is the same as H 2 except that the key for the MAC in the challenge ciphertext (i.e. for computing c * 3 ) is generated uniformly at random as opposed being set to g(x * ). We note that |Adv
A | is statistically bounded since the only information available about x * is H(x * ). But since H is compressing and g is pairwise-independent hash function, it operates as an extractor of the remaining randomness in x * and outputs a uniformly random key for the MAC. Distinguishing a uniformly random key from g(x * ) is therefore negligible and bounded by this statistical bound (see [7] for a complete argument). Decryption queries are handled as before. The same argument implies that Pr 3 [f orge] − Pr 2 [f orge] is also negligible.
It remains for us show that Pr 3 [f orge] is also negligible but this automatically follows from the unforgeability of the MAC.
Application to Adaptive Trapdoor Functions
In this section, we establish that the notions of adaptive trapdoor functions and tag-based adaptive trapdoor functions introduced by Kiltz et al. [28] are equivalent (via fully black-box reductions), resolving a main open question of [28] . In light of Section 4, we just need to show that reverse implications hold; namely, that from a randomness-recovering ECCA-secure PKE scheme we can get both ATDFs and tag-based ATDFs.
From ECCA Security to Adaptivity
To construct an adaptive trapdoor function from a uniquely randomness-recovering ECCA-secure PKE scheme, we use part of the input to the former as coins for the latter used to encrypt the other part. Namely, let PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec, Rec) be a uniquely randomness-recovering public-key encryption scheme with message-space MsgSp and coin-space Coins. Define a trapdoor function family TDF[PKE] = (Tdg, Eval, Inv) on domain MsgSp × Coins as follows:
Proposition 5.1 Suppose PKE is uniquely randomness recovering and ECCA-secure. Then TDF[PKE] defined above is adaptive one-way.
Proof: Given an AOW-adversary I against TDF[PKE], we can easily construct an ECCA-adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against PKE, as follows: 
From ECCA Security to Tag-Based Adaptivity
To construct a tag-based adaptive trapdoor function from a uniquely randomness-recovering ECCAsecure PKE scheme, we can use an analogous construction of [29, Section 4.4] . Namely, let PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec, Rec) be a uniquely randomness-recovering public-key encryption scheme. Define a tagbased trapdoor function family TB-TDF[PKE] = (Tdg, Eval, Inv) as follows: (·) . To see this, note that I 1 , I 2 does make a query of the form t ′ = t, which by consistency of PKE means that A does not query its challenge ciphertext.
Application to PKE with Non-Interactive Opening
In this section, we show that ECCA-secure encryption is a natural building-block for public key encryption with non-interactive opening (PKENO) [14, 13, 17, 18] . PKENO allows the receiver to non-interactively prove that a given ciphertext decrypts to a claimed message. Our constructions yield new and practical PKENO schemes. As discussed in the introduction, PKENO has applications to multiparty computation (e.g., auctions and elections), secure message transmission, group signatures, and more.
PKENO. Public-key encryption with non-interactive opening (PKENO) extends a scheme PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec) for public-key encryption by the following algorithms: Prove takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs a proof π. Ver takes as input a public key pk, a ciphertext c, a plaintext m and a proof π, and outputs 0 or 1.
In addition to decryption correctness, stating that Pr[Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) = m : (pk, sk) ←$ Kg(1 k )] is negligible for all k ∈ N and m ∈ MsgSp(1 k ), we require proof correctness: i.e. for all ciphertexts (i.e. strings) c:
is negligible. In [13, 17] , security of PKENO is defined by indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext and -proof attacks (IND-CCPA) and proof soundness. The former guarantees that a ciphertext hides the plaintext even when the adversary can see decryptions of and proofs for other ciphertexts; the latter formalizes that no adversary should be able to produce a proof for a ciphertext and a message which is not encrypted by that ciphertext.
Indistinguishability. Let PKENO = (Kg, Enc, Dec, Prove, Ver) be a public-key encryption scheme with non-interactive opening. We associate to PKENO and an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) the chosen-ciphertext and -proof attack experiment given on the left in Figure 2 . We require that the output of A 1 satisfies |m 0 | = |m 1 | and that A 2 does not query c to any of its oracles. We say that PKENO is chosen-ciphertext and -proof-attack secure (CCPA-secure) if Adv Proof soundness. We associate to a scheme PKENO = (Kg, Enc, Dec, Prove, Ver) and an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) a proof-soundness experiment, given on the right in Figure 2 . We say that PKENO is proof-sound if Adv proof-snd PKENO,A (k) := Pr Exp proof-snd PKENO,A (k) outputs 1 is negligible for every efficient A. We note that as compared to [13, 17] our definition of proof soundness also considers adversariallyproduced ciphertexts, which not even be a valid output of the encryption algorithm. Note that it is already required by proof correctness that the PKENO correctly proves decryption of such ciphertexts (which in general may or may not decrypt to ⊥), so it would seem that constructions should achieve this stronger notion of proof soundness anyway. Strong proof soundness. An even stronger notion of proof soundness is defined in [18] , which also handles maliciously chosen public key (i.e., security for senders against a malicious receiver). Such a notion is quite challenging to achieve, and hence we mostly focus on the above formulation of proof soundness in the paper. However, in Appendix D we define notions of strong proof soundness and discuss how our constructions can be adapted to to meet them.
Experiment Exp
ind-ccpa PKENO,A (k) b ←$ {0, 1} ; (pk, sk) ←$ Kg(1 k ) (m 0 , m 1 , St) ←$ A Dec(sk,·),Prove(sk,·) 1 (pk) c ←$ Enc(pk, m b ) d ←$ A Dec(sk,·),Prove(sk,·) 2 (pk, c, St) If d = b then return 1 else return 0 Experiment Exp proof-snd PKENO,A (k) (pk, sk) ←$ Kg(1 k ) (m ′ , π ′ , c ′ ) ←$ A(pk, sk) m ← Dec(sk, c ′ ) If Ver(pk, c ′ , m
PKENO-Compatible ECCA-Secure Encryption
A natural approach to building PKENO suggested by [14] is to use a randomness-recovering encryption scheme and have the receiver provide the recovered coins as the proof. A moment's reflection reveals that for this approach to work, the encryption scheme must be ECCA secure. In addition, as discussed in [14, 13, 18] , we also need a way for the receiver to prove correct decryption of ciphertexts not in the range of the encryption algorithm, in which case such coins may not be defined. Our goal in this section is to define a notion of PKENO-compatible ECCA-secure encryption for which we can do this.
Partial-randomness recovery. It turns out that for such schemes we do not always achieve, nor need, the notion of full randomness recovery, so we first define a natural generalization we call partialrandomness recovery, which (loosely) says that enough of the random coins are recovered to uniquely identify the underlying message. (Such a notion is alluded to in [33] , who note that their CCA-secure encryption seem is not actually fully randomness-recovering because they use a one-time signature, and is generally useful whenever we use a "publicly verifiable" but randomized component such as a one-time signature or NIZK.) However, in order to deal with the case that some ciphertexts outside the range of the encryption algorithm may not decrypt to ⊥, we also strengthen what we get from randomness-recovering encryption in some respect; see the discussion following the definition. Formally, Suppose Enc draws its coins from Coins. We say that a public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec) has partial-randomness recovery if it also has a partial-randomness recovering algorithm pRec and a message-consistency checking algorithm Cons, which with the help of partial randomness can check whether a ciphertext c encrypts a message m. Namely:
Then
• (Soundness) For all (pk, sk) ←$ Kg and all c ∈ {0, 1} * , m ∈ MsgSp(1 k ), s ∈ {0, 1} * :
Cons(pk, c, m, s) = 1 ⇒ Dec(sk, c) = m .
Relation to randomness recovery. It turns out that a fully randomness recovering scheme is not necessarily partial-randomness recovering as we have defined it. This is because, the completeness condition requires that even for invalid ciphertexts c (i.e., those that are never output by the encryption algorithm) that do not decrypt to ⊥ but rather some m = ⊥, enough partial randomness can still be recovered from c to check that it decrypts to m.
Ciphertext verifiability. We next define a notion of ciphertext verifiability, which intuitively means a verifier can check (with the help of some partial random coins) whether the decryption algorithm returns ⊥ on a given ciphertext. Let PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec, pRec, Cons) be a public-key encryption scheme with partial-randomness recovery. We say that PKE has ciphertext-verifiability if it also has a ciphertextinvalidity checking algorithm Inval such that • (Completeness) For all (pk, sk) ←$ Kg and all c ∈ {0, 1} * , let s ←$ pRec(sk, c). Then Dec(sk, c) = ⊥ ⇒ Inval(pk, c, s) = 1 .
• (Soundness) For all (pk, sk) ←$ Kg and all c ∈ {0, 1} * , s ∈ {0, 1} * :
Inval(pk, c, s) = 1 ⇒ Dec(sk, c) = ⊥ .
We write PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec, pRec, Cons, Inval).
We note that the notion of public ciphertext verifiability has been discussed informally in the literature and formalized and studied concurrently to our work by [32] . In a publicly verifiable scheme, the Inval algorithm ignores the input s. In fact, all our constructions except those that use the "more-efficient" BCHK transform [7] (the one using symmetric primitives rather than one-time signatures) are publicly verifiable.
We say that PKE is ECCA-secure if it is ECCA-secure as defined in Section 3 but where the Rec algorithm there is replaced with pRec.
PKENO-compatible ECCA encryption and PKENO from it. We call a partial-randomness recovering ECCA-secure PKE scheme with ciphertext verifiability PKENO-compatible ECCA encryption. Consider a PKENO-compatible ECCA encryption scheme PKE = (Kg pke , Enc pke , Dec pke , pRec pke , Cons pke , Inval pke ) and define the following PKENO PKENO = (Kg pke , Enc pke , Dec pke , Prove, Ver) with:
• Prove(sk, c): Output s ←$ pRec pke (sk, c).
• For the case of proof soundness, in the relevant experiment in Figure 2 , we show that IND-CCPA follows immediately from ECCA w.r.t. pRec pke . The simulator can use its pRec pke oracle to simulate the Prove oracle. To simulate the Dec oracle on a query c, the simulator queries pRec pke for c to get s and outputs ⊥ if Val pke (pk, c, s) = 0 and otherwise forwards a Dec pke oracle response.
The tag-based case. We define PKENO-compatible tag-based ECCA encryption TB-PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec, pRec, Cons, Inval) analogously, where all algorithms except Kg now take an additional input t called the tag. The completeness and soundness definitions quantify over all tags t, and the scheme is required to satisfy the tag-based ECCA definition where Rec is replaced with pRec. One can convert any PKENOcompatible tag-based ECCA encryption scheme into a PEKNO-compatible (non-tag-based) ECCA encryption scheme by using BCHK transform [7] , which preserves both partial-randomness recovery and ciphertext verifiability. Either version of the BCHK transform works, though it is interesting to that that ciphertext verifiability when using the "more-efficient" version based on symmetric-key primitives uses the fact that the Inval algorithm take as input partial randomness (since unlike the version using one-time signatures the symmetric-key primitives are not publicly verifiable). Details are in Appendix C. Hence, as per the above, PKENO-compatible tag-based ECCA encryption also yields PKENO. Looking ahead, using tag-based constructions will lead to our most efficient PKENO schemes.
A Generic Construction using Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge
We show how to obtain PKENO-compatible ECCA encryption by combining partially randomnessrecovering (pRR) ECCA secure encryption with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) to add ciphertext verifiability. (Indeed, the approach of adding a proof of well-formedness originates from [13, 18] , although not with respect to ECCA secure encryption.)
Construction. Consider a pRR ECCA-secure PKE scheme PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec, pRec, Cons) and a simulation-sound NIZK proof system NIZK = (Setup, Prv, Vrf) for the language L := {(pk, c) | ∃(m, r) : c = Enc(pk, m; r)}. We define a partial-randomness-recovering scheme PKE prr = (Kg prr , Enc prr , Dec prr , Cons prr , Inval prr ) as follows:
Output pk := (crs, pk) and sk := (crs, pk, sk).
• Enc prr ((crs, pk), m; r): Set c := Enc(pk, m; r) and τ ←$ Prv(crs, (pk, c), (m, r)); output c := (c, τ ).
• Dec prr ((crs, pk, sk), (c, τ )): If Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 0 then output ⊥; else output Dec(sk, c).
• pRec prr ((crs, pk, sk), (c, τ )): If Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 0 then output ⊥; else output pRec(sk, c).
• Cons prr ((crs, pk), (c, τ ), m, s): Return 1 iff Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 1 and Cons(pk, c, m, s) = 1.
• Inval prr ((crs, pk), (c, τ ), s): Return 1 iff Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 0.
Proposition 6.2 Suppose PKE is partial-randomness-recovering and ECCA-secure and NIZK is simulationsound and zero-knowledge. Then PKE prr [PKE, NIZK], defined above, is an ECCA-secure PKE scheme with partial randomness-recovery and public verifiability (i.e., it is PKENO-compatible).
Proof: We first show that the scheme PKE prr is still ECCA-secure (with respect to the partial randomness recovery function pRec). Let A be an adversary against ECCA security of PKE prr . We use A to break ECCA security of the underlying scheme PKE. Upon receiving our challenge c * , we simulate a NIZK proof τ * to create a challenge (c * , τ * ) for A. Consider A making an ECCA-query Dec * for (c, τ ): if τ is invalid on c, we return ⊥; else we forward c to our own oracle and give A the reply. Note that simulation soundness of the NIZK implies that A cannot produce a query (c * , τ ) for a τ = τ * which is valid for c * . (This is formally proven analogously to the proof of full anonymity of the group signature construction in [3] , where a group signature is defined as a CCA-secure ciphertext and a simulation-sound NIZK proof of well-formedness of the ciphertext.) This means that every query A makes can be forwarded to our own oracle.
Finally, we need to show completeness and soundness of both partial randomness recovery and ciphertext verifiability, as defined in Section 6.1. For all these notions, let (pk = (crs, pk), sk) be the output of Kg prr .
Completeness of partial-randomness recovery: Let c ∈ {0, 1} * and let s ←$ pRec prr (sk, c). Suppose Dec prr (sk, c) = m with m = ⊥. By the definition of Dec prr we get Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 1 ( * ). By the definition of pRec prr , this means s is the output of pRec(sk, c). By completeness of Cons, we have Cons(pk, c, m, s) = 1, and thus together with ( * ): Cons prr (pk, (c, τ ), m, s) = 1.
Soundness of partial-randomness recovery: Let c ∈ {0, 1} * , m ∈ MsgSp(1 k ) and s ∈ {0, 1} * . Suppose Cons prr (pk, (c, τ ), m, s) = 1, that is Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 1 ( * ) and Cons(pk, c, m, s) = 1. By soundness of Cons we have Dec(sk, c) = m, which together with ( * ) yields: Dec prr (sk, (c, τ )) = m.
Completeness of ciphertext verifiability: Let c ∈ {0, 1} * and let s ←$ pRec prr (sk, c). Suppose Dec prr (sk, (c, τ )) = ⊥. Then we have either (1) Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 0 or (2) Dec(sk, c) = ⊥. We show (2) implies (1): If Vrf output 1 then by soundness of NIZK there exist (m, r) : c = Enc(pk, m; r). By correctness of PKE we have Dec(sk, c) = m which contradicts (1) . In either case we have therefore Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 0 and thus Inval prr (pk, (c, τ ), s) = 1.
Soundness of ciphertext verifiability: Let c ∈ {0, 1} * and s ∈ {0, 1} * and assume Inval prr (pk, (c, τ ), s) = 1, that is, Vrf(crs, (pk, c), τ ) = 0. Then by definition of Dec prr , we have Dec prr (sk, (c, τ )) = ⊥.
Constructing PKENO-compatible tag-based PKE using NIZK. An analogous construction works to construct PKENO-compatible ECCA-secure tag-based PKE from partial-randomness recovering ECCAsecure tag-based PKE. The latter can be converted into PKENO-compatible ECCA encryption using one-time signatures or symmetric primitives as explained in Appendix C.
6.3 Efficient CCA-secure PKENO-Compatible Tag-Based PKE using Groth-Sahai It is possible to construct NIZKs efficiently in the random-oracle model, but the only known efficient instantiation of NIZKs without random oracles to date are Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs [22] , which allow to prove a certain class of statements over bilinear groups. Moreover, as shown in [30] , GS proofs can be made simulation-sound (SS) at a moderate price. We show how to build an efficient DLIN-based partial-randomness recovering tag-based PKE scheme such that the statements we are proving fall in this class.
Essentially, the idea is to build a decision-linear (DLIN) based tag-based ATDF for which proving that a claimed image point has a preimage is GS statement. We then build from it a PKENO-compatible tag-based PKE scheme as per Appendix C. Note that the GS statement here is weaker than a proof of well-formedness of the ciphertext for the CCA scheme (as used in our generic construction above), so it is somewhat surprising that it suffices for a PKENO construction. (The intuition is that, if the proof verifies, the adversary is obliged to provide the preimage, which allows to verify the rest of the ciphertext if needed.) Specifically, we use the lossy trapdoor function (LTDF) and an all-but-one (ABO) TDF from DLIN by Freeman et al. [16] , which can be combined to a tag-based ATDF using the transformation of [28] . Note that we use the the DLIN-based instantiations rather than the original DDH-based ones of [33] because Groth-Sahai proofs require bilinear groups in which DDH is false.
We first describe the ABO-TDF. In a group G of order p, generated by g ∈ G, the scheme is defined as follows. To sample a function with a lossy branch b * , choose a matrix A ←$ Z n×n p with rank 1 and define M := A − b * I n , where I n is the identity matrix. Define S ∈ G n×n as the matrix with components S ij := g m ij , where m ij are the components of M . The function indexed by S is evaluated on a branch b on input x ∈ {0, 1} n as follows: f S,b ( x) ∈ G n is the vector whose i-th component is defined as S x j ij ·g b·x i . In the language of Groth-Sahai proofs, interpreting f i = S x j ij ·g b·x i as an equation over variables x 1 , . . . , x n , this is a multi-exponentiation equation (called multi-scalar multiplication equation when using additive notation, as in [22] ). For a set of such equations over the same variables, Groth-Sahai proofs provide an efficient proof of satisfiability; thus, a proof that a value has a preimage under f S,b .
The same holds for the LTDF, which is a special case of the above for b = 0. In our construction we combine these into a TB-ATDF using a target-collision-resistant hash function T as per [28] as follows. A public key is a pair of keys (ek ltf , ek abo ) for LF and ABO-F, respectively. The evaluation of ATDF on input x ∈ {0, 1} k and tag t under key (ek ltf , ek abo ) is defined as (y 1 , y 2 ) with
Adding Groth-Sahai proofs that for both y 1 and y 2 there exists a preimage x (which is the same for both), this gives us a TB-ATDF with public verifiability of preimage existence. Finally, using the construction of ECCA PKE from tag-based ECCA PKE in Section 4.3, we get a PKENO-compatible ECCA-secure tag-based PKE scheme.
PKENO-Compatible ECCA Encryption from Range-Verifiable ATDFs
Although our DLIN-based instantiation avoids using generic NIZKs or random oracles, it is probably not efficient enough for practical use. Here we show that using a tag-based ATDF with an additional property we call range verifiability, we can directly obtain a PKENO-compatible ECCA-secure tag-based PKE scheme without using NIZK at all. Intuitively, this property allows us to check the property that the Groth-Sahai statement in our above construciton is proving, so that there is no need for a separate proof. We show that the tag-based ATDF constructed in [28] from the instance-independent RSA assumption (II-RSA) has this property.
Range verifiable tag-based TDFs. We call a tag-based TDF range verifiable if it can be augmented by an efficient algorithm RVrf such that or any key pair (ek, sk) and any tuple (t, c), RVrf(ek, t, c) returns 1 if and only if there exists x such that c = Eval(ek, t, x). Proof sketch. The proof is quite straightforward. We simply need to show that given an efficient RVrf for the TB-TDF, it is possible to design an efficient RVrf ′ for the PKE. We define RVrf ′ such that on pk, t, and the ciphertext ((c 1,1 , c 1,2 ) , . . . , (c ℓ,1 , c ℓ,2 )) as in Section 4.3, it runs RVrf on pk, t, c i,1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and returns 1 if and only if all invocations of RVrf return 1.
Range verifiable tag-based ATDF from II-RSA. The tag-based ATDF of [28] based on the instance-independent RSA (II-RSA) assumption is a one example of such TDFs. The domain and range of this tag-based ATDF (which is in fact a permutation) is Z * N , i.e., the group of multiplicatively invertible elements modulo N = pq. In this case the associated range verifying function RVrf(ek, t, c) returns 1 if and only if c < N . Note that we need to relax our definitions to allow completeness and soundness to consider PPT generated inputs and fail with negligible probability, since the adversary may produce a c in Z N \ Z * N with negliglible probability assuming factoring N is hard. (For simplicitly, we do not make these relaxations in our formal definitions.)
The resulting PKENO scheme based on II-RSA given by Proposition 6.3 is quite efficient, requiring only one 512-bit exponentiation to encrypt. Indeed, it is exactly the same RSA-based CCA PKE scheme from [28] , which was already of note for its efficiency even without showing that it is also a PKENO. In terms of efficiency this compares favorably to the previous DLIN-based construction of [18] which requires multiple exponentiations (but is secure under a more standard assumption).
is negligible. We say that PKE is tag-based [29] with tag-space TagSp if Enc, Dec take an additional input t ∈ TagSp(1 k ) called the tag and for all k ∈ N, m ∈ MsgSp(1 k ), and t ∈ TagSp(1 k ), Pr[Dec(sk, t, Enc(pk, t, m)) = m : (pk, sk) ←$ Kg(1 k )] with probability 1.
Authenticated Encryption. We use the definition of [25] for authenticated encryption. An authenticated symmetric encryption (AE) scheme AE = (AE.Enc, AE.Dec) is specified by its encryption algorithm AE.Enc (encrypting m ∈ MsgSp(k) with a key K ∈ K(k)) and decryption algorithm AE.Dec (returning m ∈ MsgSp(k) or ⊥). Here we restrict ourselves to deterministic AE.Enc and AE.Dec. The AE scheme needs to provide privacy (indistinguishability against one-time attacks) and authenticity (ciphertext authenticity against one-time attacks). This is simultaneously captured by defining the ae-ot-advantage of an adversary A as:
Here, LoR b (m 0 , m 1 ) returns AE.Enc(K, m b ), and A is allowed only one query to this left-or-right encryption oracle, with a pair of equal length messages. Furthermore, the decrypt-or-reject oracle DoR 0 (C) returns m ← AE.Dec(K, C) and DoR 1 (C) always returns ⊥ (reject). A is allowed only one query to this oracle which must be different from the output of the left-or-right oracle. An encryption scheme is a one-time authenticated encryption if Adv
ot-ae
A,AE (k) is negligible for any PPT adversary A. Key Encapsulation Mechanisms. The KEM/DEM paradigm was first formalized in [12] . We borrow our formal definitions from [25] . A key-encapsulation mechanism KEM = (KEM.kg, KEM.enc, KEM.enc) with key-space K(k) consists of three polynomial-time algorithms. Via (pk, sk) ←$ KEM.kg(1 k ) the randomized key-generation algorithm produces public/secret keys for security parameter k; via (K, C) ←$ KEM.enc(pk), the randomized encapsulation algorithm creates a uniformly distributed symmetric key K ∈ K(k) together with a ciphertext C; via K ← KEM.dec(sk, C) the possessor of secret key sk decrypts ciphertext C to get back a key K which is an element in K or a special rejection symbol ⊥. For consistency, we require that for all all (K, C) ←$ KEM.enc(pk) we have Pr[KEM.dec(sk, C) = K] = 1, where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, sk) ←$ KEM.kg(1 k ), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. Here we only consider KEMs that produce perfectly uniformly distributed keys (i.e., we require that for all public keys pk that can be output by KEM.kg, the first component of KEM.enc(pk) has uniform distribution). 
Experiment Exp

B From ATDF to ECCA via KEM/DEM
The above constructions assume that the ATDF/tb-ATDF only provides us with a single hardcore bit. But, if a linear number of hardcore bits are available (e.g. based on Lossy TDFs as discussed in [28] ), one can design significantly more efficient ECCA PKE constructions. The basic idea is simple: we use the ATDF/tb-ATDF with linear hardcore bits to encrypt a one-time secret key k via a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), and use k to encrypt the message via a data encapsulation mechanism (DEM). The standard KEM/DEM paradigm guarantees that the resulting hybrid PKE scheme is CCA secure if the KEM component and the DEM component are both CCA secure 6 (e.g. see [12] ).
In our case, however, we need the hybrid PKE to be ECCA secure and randomness recovering as well. One can construct a KEM based on a ATDF by simply using the hardcore bits as the one-time key. It is easy to see that this construction is both ECCA secure and randomness recovering. The natural next step is to use a CCA (or ECCA) DEM component to obtain a hybrid PKE with the desired properties.
CCA security of DEM is not sufficient. Surpringly, this does not work: hybrid encryption does not preserve the ECCA security of the KEM. Roughly speaking, the subtlety in the proof arises when the simulator needs to answer decryption queries for ciphertexts that have the same KEM component as the challenge ciphertext but a different DEM component. In the standard proof, such decryption queries are answered by decrypting the DEM component and returning the message (without having to decrypt the KEM component). But, to achieve ECCA security, we need to return all the randomness to adversary, including those used in the KEM component. To solve this we instead use a a one-time authenticated encryption scheme as the DEM, in which case we show the resulting hybrid PKE is ECCA secure and randomness recovering.
Lets denote by KEM, the KEM component of the above construction. It is easy to see that |Adv
